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International trade and FDI, as well as other forms of cross-border economic activities, 
are essential to globalization, even in the emerging era of neo-globalization as a unique 
balance between globalization and de-globalization. Despite the hype, globalization is a 
relatively new phenomenon. In the past few decades, international trade and FDI were largely 
regional in scope (Cantwell et al, 2010; Rugman, 2003; Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). For 
globalization as the highest stage of internationalization, inter-continental economic activities 
are much more critical than intra-continental ones. In recent history, inter-continental 
economic activities have often occurred across the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. This 
contrasts with much older types of inter-continental economic activities that occurred in the 
form of cross-land exchanges. For example, in the ancient Silk Road era, China and Europe 
engaged in inter-continental economic exchanges that gave rise to economic, social, 
technological, and cultural transformation in both China and Europe. This historical era 
included the birth of the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution as the most significant 
events in the history of East-Meeting-West (Li, 2012). Now it seems that history is repeating 
itself in another context, as evidenced by the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI). Even though the 
BRI was initiated by China, it cannot be considered a sole effort on the part of China. Rather, 
it could be reframed as a mega-project of international collaboration between China and 
Europe in a move toward an inter-continental ecosystem (in terms of a cross-continental 
community of self-organized, yet interdependent, members engaging in co-opetition based 
upon an institutional platform as their shared infrastructure for interaction, cf. Jacobides, 
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Cennamo & Gawer, 2018; Nambisan, Zahra & Luo, 2019; Shipilov & Gawer, 2019), and as 
one of the most critical events in the emerging era of neo-globalization. The purpose of this 
paper is to identify the salient challenges of the BRI to intercontinental economic integration, 
and discuss the major strategic implications of BRI for multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
around the world. In particular, our study bears critical implications for the debates over the 
potential effect of China’s international relationships on China’s domestic policies, and also 
the domestic forces underlying such international relationships, even under the condition of 
economic “cold war” (e.g., Allison, 2017; Petricevic & Teece, 2019; Teece, 2020; Witt, 2019; 
see Li, 2019 for a review).  
 The Background and Challenges of BRI  
Although the BRI could be viewed as a mega-project of international collaboration 
between China and Europe for long-term symbiosis, there remain concerns about, and 
challenges to, its effective implementation, some of which represent more fundamental 
controversies. In particular, we need to examine such concerns and challenges from the 
European perspective, above and beyond the Chinese perspective. 
Europe and China are major trade partners, with Europe being the largest trade partner in 
the world for China, and China as the second largest trade partner for Europe. The growing 
prominence of China as an economic superpower, and its growing confidence as a leading 
global political force, has led the European Union (EU) to develop a new strategy toward 
China relative to its previous position in 2006 (EC, 2016). Some of the main tenets of the 
European view of the BRI can be drawn from this 2016 position paper and also from more 
recent policy papers, such as “EU-China, a strategic outlook” (EC, 2019) and “Connecting 
Europe and Asia: Building Blocks for an EU Strategy” (EC, 2018). The general view is that a 
good and strong relationship between China and Europe will be mutually beneficial, while 
further fostering trade and investment between the two major blocs will be facilitated by a 
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strengthening of the physical road, train, and sea connections and the digital infrastructural 
links. In the 2018 paper, the European approach was framed as “sustainable, comprehensive 
and rules-based connectivity” (EC, 2018: 2). Hence, there is no doubt that Europe recognizes 
the importance of strengthening the connections between China and Europe, but there remain 
major concerns over the way China is executing the BRI as its core framework to develop its 
connections with Europe.  
One of the key concerns relates to “the rules of the game” that will govern the way the 
BRI is implemented. Europe’s rules are market-based, such as the rules for transparent and 
open procurement in infrastructure projects. From Europe’s perspective, China does not 
strictly follow these rules as the State has enormous control and power over firms, especially 
in the case of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The key criticism is that this does not create a 
level playing field for all firms because various unfair practices mean the State provides 
specific support to Chinese firms in general and SOEs in particular. In the context of the BRI, 
the concern is that China is pushing its own model of doing business onto the countries and 
organizations along the route of the BRI. Another concern is that the conditional debt-based 
investment under the BRI may create dependency on China of vulnerable countries and 
organizations. The long-term goal of the EU is to strengthen trade and investment under a 
transparent and rule-based international order to eliminate unfair practices, while including 
the reciprocity among trade and investment partners, and also the improvement in human-
rights records in trade and investment. To achieve the above goal, it is imperative that Europe 
maintains its position concerning fair market competition and rule-based practices. However, 
Europe seems to be split on how to implement its position concerning China, especially in the 
context of the BRI. On the one hand, some (such as the former Prime Minister of Belgium) 
argue that Europe should operate as one strong voice (Verhofstadt, 2019). On the other hand, 
others argue that Europe should maintain its overall policy toward China, but it should allow 
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each member of the EU to have some autonomy and flexibility in its own specific practices 
concerning its trade and investment practices with China (Geraci, 2019). This argument is 
reflected in China’s signing of MoUs with Italy, Luxembourg, and Switzerland (non-EU, but 
European) in the recent past.  
The issue of sustainability of investment in the BRI infrastructure is a second area of 
concern for Europe. Europe considers sound environmental performance critical to any long-
term economic growth and prosperity for all citizens. It recognizes the EU and China’s 
“shared commitments and interest in global sustainable development and the 2030 
(sustainable development) Agenda” (EC, 2019: 2). However, it is concerned that, while 
“Chinese investments have contributed to the growth of many receiving economies, … these 
investments frequently neglect socioeconomic and financial sustainability and may result in 
high-level indebtedness and transfer of control over strategic assets and resources. This 
compromises efforts to promote good social and economic governance and, most 
fundamentally, the rule of law and human rights” (EC, 2019: 4). For example, specifically 
concerning the issue of climate change where the EU sees China as a leading partner in 
promoting the Paris Agreement, it also notes that China is a leading player in constructing 
coal-fired power plants in various countries, thus undermining the achievement of the goals 
of the Paris Agreement (EC, 2019).  
Europe has been working closely with, and generally recognizes that, China is 
increasingly active in its efforts to address these two major concerns. However, a deeper-
level and more fundamental concern from the European perspective is geopolitical in nature. 
In its latest strategic outlook on EU-China relations, Europe considers China to be a 
“cooperation partner”, a “negotiating partner”, an “economic competitor”, and “a systemic 
rival promoting alternative models of governance” (EC, 2019: 1). It then continues to stress 
that a whole-Europe approach is needed to defend its interests and values. This illustrates the 
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paradoxical tension with which Europe is trying to cope: on the one hand, Europe adopts a 
pragmatic approach where expanding economic ties with China is seen as important; on the 
other hand, Europe adopts a principle-based approach where such major concerns as “good 
governance”, “sustainable socio-economic development benefitting all participants involved”, 
“transparency”, and “the international rule-based order” are central to its strategy to create 
stronger connections between Europe and China. Not surprisingly, some concerns over the 
BRI mega-project are aptly formulated by one observer: “The BRI (…) to its critics is a case 
of China now exporting its philosophy of development beyond its borders - a philosophy 
which is largely self-interested, lacks legal structure, and supports state development in order 
to build a strong Chinese state” (Brown, 2018: 219). An illustration of European concerns is 
a joint statement made by the European ambassadors to China by 27 (out of 28) European 
nations in 2018 about the lack of international transparency in the BRI procurement process 
to the extent that the BRI execution “runs counter to the EU agenda for liberalizing trade 
and pushes the balance of power in favor of subsidized Chinese companies” (Heide et. al., 
2018). 
Notwithstanding the major criticisms, Europe has shown increasing interest in the BRI 
mega-project, and its growing engagement is visible compared to the limited responses at its 
onset, both at the level of individual European countries and at the level of the EU. For 
example, Europe’s expanding involvement in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) is an illustration of the increasing engagement of Europe in the BRI. Many European 
countries, such as Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, 
became the voting members of the AIIB from the end of 2015. Europe considers this 
approach by the AIIB to be positive because it boosts the BRI mega-project into a stronger 
position as a multilateral initiative; one which has the potential to gain further support from 
Europe. It is also believed that such voting power could help to sway the financial framework 
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towards market-based rules, transparency, and good governance principles. This view is also 
expressed in a statement adopted by the European Parliament at the end of 2015, i.e., it 
“believes that given the geostrategic relevance of this (One Belt, One Road) initiative it 
should be pursued in a multilateral way; [and it] believes that it is of the utmost importance 
to develop synergies and projects in full transparency and with the involvement of all 
stakeholders” (EP, 2015: 9). In the same document, it was further stated that it is important to 
strengthen the strategic infrastructure links between China and Europe, such as cooperation 
on infrastructure investment along the New Silk Road and New Maritime Silk Road (EP, 
2015: 8).  
One of the major recent initiatives on the part of the EU has been the establishment of the 
EU-Asia connectivity strategy and, related to that, an EU-China connectivity platform was set 
up (the fourth meeting of the platform took place in April 2019). One of the aims is to create 
stronger ties between the well-established Trans-European Network and Asian networks and 
to explore possible synergies with the BRI initiative.  Overall, there is no doubt that Europe 
recognizes the need for, and supports the development of, further infrastructure to strengthen 
the connections between China and Europe. It considers a multilateral framework with clear 
rules as the best possible vehicle to move this forward, and if the BRI mega-project moves in 
that direction Europe might become more receptive to it. 
Responses to the BRI beyond Europe have been mostly positive, this is certainly so in the 
case of developing countries that are (potential) hosts for the various BRI projects given their 
position in the Belt and Road and the expected impetus those projects provide for economic 
development (Kohli & Zucker, 2019). The recently concluded second global forum on the 
BRI also indicated broad support for its goals. However, mostly due to geopolitical concerns 
or specific discontent with particular BRI projects or broader Chinese policies, a number of 
countries are not represented, e.g., India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey (Kuo, 2019). Further, the US 
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view of the BRI was initially cautious under the Obama administration, but seemingly more 
positive in the first year of the Trump presidency. However, as the trade conflict between the 
US and China escalates, the Trump administration has become more critical of the BRI (Cai, 
2018). The US is mostly concerned about the geopolitical implications as it considers it a 
challenge to the leading role of the US and the doctrine of free market institutions and its 
democratic underpinnings (Petricevic & Teece, 2019; Teece, 2020; Witt, 2019). Moreover, 
the BRI is seen as a way for China to expand its influence in the regions encompassing the 
Belt and Road, potentially leading to those countries being much less receptive to the US 
influences. While the geopolitical concerns may be central to the perspectives of the US and 
India, the main concerns of other, both advanced and emerging, countries center on the issues 
of sustainability, transparency, inclusiveness, and the application of fair market-based rules. 
Hence, while many countries have taken an initially positive stance regarding the BRI, a 
significant progress is required in those areas of concerns to cement a more long-term 
commitment to the BRI mega-project.  
 The Emerging Perspective of an Inter-continental Ecosystem 
As reflected by the above debates from diverse perspectives, “consensus has not been 
reached about what BRI is, how it may affect others, and how it may evolve” (Alon, Zhang & 
Lattemann 2018: 12). In spite of this, the major impact of the BRI on the world is generally 
assumed, rather than convincingly articulated, to include such issues as inter-continental 
cooperation, inclusive participation, and the emerging era of neo-globalization.  
For the specific purpose of convincingly clarifying the nature and relevance of BRI, we 
propose a three-level framework for its analysis to include its surface, its middle, and its deep 
levels. While most researchers, policymakers, and practitioners have recognized the features 
of the BRI at both surface and middle levels (see Blanchard & Flint, 2017), we argue that the 
 8 
deep-level essence of the BRI mega-project as an inter-continental ecosystem for long-term 
symbiosis has not yet been adequately articulated. 
First, at the surface level, the BRI mega-project has been perceived by most Chinese 
researchers, policymakers, and practitioners as a China-centered effort aimed at helping 
China solve the problem of over-capacity in its infrastructure and manufacturing sectors. This 
would be achieved by the expansion of the export market for China’s excessive inventories 
and oversupplied stocks to those potential markets in the less developed regions of Central 
Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Such a view is widely shared 
among Chinese researchers, policymakers, and practitioners, and it is also more or less shared 
among their counterparts in other emerging regions (e.g., Chen, 2017; Ke, 2019; Liu, 2017). 
However, this view with a focus on the “hard power” of building physical infrastructure from 
China’s perspective is rarely shared across Europe and the US, where a different perspective 
is widely adopted, even to the extent of economic “cold war” and the so-called Thucydides’s 
Trap in terms of the conflict between a rising power and a ruling power inevitably resulting 
in a war (e.g., Allison, 2017; Li, 2019; Petricevic & Teece, 2019; Teece, 2020; Witt, 2019).  
Second, at the middle level, most European and American researchers, policymakers, and 
practitioners tend to believe that the BRI mega-project is an inevitable course on which China, 
as an emerging power, is expected to embark given its rise on a global scale in the new era 
(e.g., Callahan, 2016; Gave, C. & Gave, 2019; also see Blanchard & Flint, 2017). From this 
perspective, the BRI mega-project is the “natural” or inevitable by-product of China’s new 
global status as a fast-growing wealth and power with an increasing influence over the rest of 
the world. In particular, this view focuses on the “soft power” of rearranging institutions in 
the world in line with the “China Dream” (Callahan, 2016). However, as this captures only 
part of the BRI mega-project, this perspective is far from complete.  
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Third, at the deep level, it is our central argument that the BRI mega-project can be 
interpreted as an expression of a new phase of globalization or neo-globalization as a unique 
balance between globalization and de-globalization that includes intercontinental integration. 
Distinctive from the above two views with the focus on either the “hard power” at the surface 
level or the “soft power” at the middle level (but both views are biased as China-centered), 
the third view argues that BRI should be reframed as a multilateral effort involving multiple 
parties, especially three major ones: (1) China; (2) Europe, and (3) all countries along the 
route between China and Europe. Although initiated by China, the BRI mega-project is by no 
means only China-centered; rather, it could be reframed as an inter-continental, multi-party 
cooperative ecosystem for long-term symbiosis. This can, and should, be the deep-level and 
long-term vision for the BRI mega-project. It is no accident that the BRI mega-project starts 
in China, but finishes in Europe. This is not only repeating the history in the past, but also 
making the history at the present and for the future. It is worth noting that this deep-level 
view has not been clearly articulated before, neither by scholars in China nor by others 
outside China (e.g., Li, 2019; Petricevic & Teece, 2019; Teece, 2020; see Li, 2018 for an 
exception; also see Alon et al., 2018 for a review). 
Strategically speaking, we can envision a three-stage pattern of evolution of the BRI to 
capture its deep-level essence as an inter-continental ecosystem for long-term symbiosis. At 
the first stage, the BRI mega-project can, and should, start with strategic cooperation between 
China and Europe as two strategic endpoints. With strategic help from Europe, China can 
upgrade and transform itself from a middle-level manufacturing base into a world-class top-
level manufacturing power. In other words, China can leverage Europe, often via the merger 
and acquisition (M&A) of so-called “hidden champions” in Europe (especially in Germany, 
Northern Italy, and the Nordic region). This can be achieved via a novel mode of post-M&A 
integration which we call “invisible-touch”, i.e., in terms of limited integration in governance 
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structure on the surface, but accelerated integration in the domains of business operation and 
cultural alignment below the surface (Li, 2018). This seeks to upgrade Chinese industries and 
firms and successfully implement China’s “supply-side reforms” (in terms of enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of upstream value-chain) in the special context of China’s “new 
normal” (in terms of new contexts in China, including the slower economic growth and more 
intensive competition). This is noticeably reflected in the case of Geely-Volvo M&A (Yakob, 
Nakamura & Ström, 2018). From the perspective of European firms, this cooperation and 
integration with Chinese companies makes sense for a number of reasons. That is, they can 
leverage the Chinese strengths in some aspects of manufacturing (e.g., cost, speed, and 
flexibility), enhance connectivity to the Chinese market, and benefit from the strategic 
investment of Chinese partners in the further development of production and innovation 
capacity and still preserve their European identity. This is the first leverage, or “seesaw”, of 
our envisioned deep-level essence of the BRI mega-project. From this perspective, it is clear 
that the BRI mega-project is by no means China-centered; rather, it is the inter-continental 
multilateral partnership that matters most. 
At its second stage, the BRI mega-project can continue the strategic cooperation between 
China and Europe as two strategic endpoints and further expand into the regions or countries 
along the way between China and Europe, including Central Asia, the Middle East, South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. The BRI mega-project will take the form of establishing 
diverse industrial parks and other forms of three-party cooperation between China, Europe, 
and local partners. This is the second leverage, or “seesaw”, of our envisioned deep-level 
essence of the BRI mega-project. Again, from this perspective, it is clear that the BRI mega-
project is by no means China-centered; rather, it is in essence an inter-continental partnership. 
At the third stage, the BRI mega-project can finally expand its inter-continental link 
beyond its original scope to the rest of the world, including Australia, New Zealand, North 
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America, and Latin America. This is the third leverage, or “seesaw”, of our envisioned deep-
level essence of the BRI mega-project. There should be no doubt that, from this perspective, 
the BRI mega-project cannot be solely China-centered; rather, it is the inter-continental 
partnership that will allow this vision to materialize. In particular, the BRI mega-project bears 
a far-reaching political implication that G3 (i.e., the US, China, and Europe), rather than G2 
(either the US and China, the US and Europe, or China and Europe), is the most stable and 
constructive geo-political and geo-economic ecosystem with diverse global players as both 
competitive and cooperative forces for their long-term symbiosis. In this sense, the notion of 
an inter-continental ecosystem could be framed as a trans-continental community of largely 
self-organized, yet highly interdependent, members with co-opetition as the most common 
mechanism of interaction among richly diverse members in the context of a shared platform 
in terms of technological and institutional infrastructure to enable the long-term symbiosis in 
the community (cf. Jacobides et al., 2018; Nambisan et al., 2019; Shipilov & Gawer, 2019). 
To summarize our three-stage pattern of the BRI mega-project for its deep-level essence 
as an intercontinental ecosystem for long-term symbiosis embedded in both historical and 
current patterns of exchange between Europe and China, as well as the emerging era of neo- 
globalization above and beyond the economic ties between Europe and China into Africa and 
other continents as a trans-continental ecosystem, we present Figure 1 to illustrate the core 
components (see Figure 1 for details). It is worth repeating that the BRI can be reframed as 
primarily geo-economic, rather than geo-political, in nature.  In terms of delivering on these 
stages of BRI development, the case of Sino-Italy collaboration is elaborated below as a 
potentially viable approach or role model.   
The Case of Sino-Italy MoU 
Italy’s position toward the BRI mega-project is indicative of the more pragmatic approach 
in Europe. Given the economic importance of the EU’s relationship with China, enhancing 
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trade and investment can potentially benefit both sides. As the first large European economy 
to support the BRI, Italy is leading the way in strengthening economic connections with 
China, and could possibly serve as a role model for other countries (Geraci, 2019). One of the 
reasons for Italy to be proactive is that its trade and investment volume with China remains 
relatively small compared to other European countries, such as the UK and Germany. Part of 
the motivation to engage proactively with China for the BRI mega-project is to regain some 
historical connections, and also strengthen its competitive position relative to other European 
countries (Geraci, 2019). There are serious concerns in the EU over Italy’s support of the BRI 
mega-project, as shown in the signing of a MoU in March 2019 (MoU, 2019) and some see it 
as a break away from a unified voice of the EU. However, while recognizing the EU as an 
overarching framework in terms of its policies regarding trade and investment, Italy’s 
position is that the EU member countries are not only partners, but also competitors, so each 
EU member country has the autonomy and flexibility to promote its own specific projects 
concerning trade and investment.  
The MoU between China and Italy specifically addresses six major issues concerning the 
BRI meta-project as follows (MoU, 2019): 
Part 1:  Objectives and Guiding Principles of Cooperation:  
 
The Parties will work together within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to translate mutual 
complementary strengths into advantages for practical cooperation and sustainable growth, 
supporting synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and priorities identified in the 
Investment Plan for Europe and the Trans-European Networks, bearing in mind discussions 
in the EU China Connectivity Platform. This will also enable the Parties to enhance their 
political relations, economic ties, and people-to-people exchanges. The Parties will 
strengthen cooperation and promote regional connectivity within an open, inclusive and 
balanced framework beneficial to all, so as to promote regional peace, security, stability and 
sustainable development.” 
  
The Parties will promote bilateral cooperation based on the following principles: 
a. Guided by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter the Parties will work for 
common development and prosperity, deepened mutual trust and beneficial cooperation; 
b. In accordance with their respective domestic laws and regulations, consistent with their 
respective international obligations, the Parties will strive to promote the smooth progress 
of their cooperation projects; 
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c. The Parties will explore synergies and ensure consistency and complementarity with 
existing bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms and regional cooperation 
platforms. 
  
Part 2. Areas of Cooperation: 
 
The BRI-related cooperation between China and Italy will include six major areas, i.e., policy 
dialogue; transport, logistics and infrastructure; unimpeded trade and investment; financial 
cooperation; people-to-people connectivity, and finally green development cooperation 
 
Part 3. Modes of Cooperation: 
 
Modes of cooperation may include, but are not limited to:  
(i) The exchange of high-level visits and discussions within existing governmental and 
non-governmental exchange mechanisms. The Parties will expand information-
sharing in diverse fields and with multiple channels, to increase transparency and 
encourage the participation of people from all sectors of society. 
(ii) Exploring the development of pilot programs in key areas, economic exchanges and 
cooperation, joint research, capacity building, personnel exchanges and training. 
 
The Parties will explore mutually beneficial models of cooperation to support the 
implementation of major programs, under the Belt and Road Initiative. The Parties will 
follow market principles, promote cooperation between public and private capital, encourage 
investment and financing support through diversified models. Both Parties reiterate their 
engagement towards investments which are socially and environmentally sustainable and 
economically viable.  
 
The Parties will jointly explore opportunities of cooperation in Italy and in China and discuss 
cooperation in third Countries. The Parties are committed to modes of cooperation that are 
advantageous to all participants and to projects that benefit third Countries by supporting 
their priorities in terms of development and the needs of their people, in a fiscally, socially, 
economically and environmentally sound and sustainable manner. 
The relevant Authorities of the Parties may conclude arrangements for collaboration in 
specific sectorial fields and for the creation of specific cooperation frameworks. 
 
Part 4. Cooperation Mechanism 
 
The Parties will make full use of existing bilateral mechanisms to develop cooperation in the 
framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
 
The Italy-China Government Committee will be used to monitor progress and follow up. 
 
Part 5. Settlement of Differences 
 
Part 6. Applicable Law 
 
Further, by following the EU’s single voice approach under all conditions Italy would 
diminish the opportunities it could have to promote its national interests, largely because the 
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voices of Germany and France tend to be somewhat dominant in the EU. Notwithstanding 
Italy’s bilateral link with China through the BRI mega-project, the MoU “contains language 
and concepts that bring BRI projects closer to EU best practice on issues of climate change, 
transparency and making sure the playing field is level” (Geraci, 2019). Adjacent to the 
direct collaboration between China and Italy, the two countries have also signed another 
MoU for collaboration on infrastructure projects in Africa, which is a further illustration of 
the necessity and feasibility of the BRI mega-project beyond China and Europe into other 
regions, thus highly consistent with the above-mentioned three-stage pattern of the BRI 
mega-project.  
Finally, the MoU could also serve as a litmus test to ascertain China’s intentions, and its 
capability, to deliver on its promises for the long-term and sustainable success of the BRI 
mega-project. In other words, the MoU will put critical pressure on China to keep its promise. 
However, the MoU has a reciprocal effect as it concerns two-way traffic. Hence, the MoU 
can awaken Italy from the complacency of its recent past, and thereby accelerate the pace at 
which it can determine ways to strengthen its economic links with China as a new economic 
superpower. In this sense, the role of MoU as a litmus test is not only for China, but also for 
Italy. Hence, the actual effect of the BRI mega-project remains to be seen, also in the case of 
Italy as a role model for other European countries. However, if Italy’s proactive stance is 
shown to be economically beneficial, the likelihood of Italy serving as a role model will 
certainly increase.  
Strategic Options for MNEs in Response to BRI 
Increased intercontinental connectivity, such as envisaged by the BRI in combination 
with the uncertain evolution of neo-globalization, has several implications for MNEs. The 
BRI intends to strengthen the links between the major economic blocs of China and Europe, 
and to enhance integration with the various countries along the various routes involved. In a 
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way, this is a reflection of the change in the balance of economic power that has occurred 
over recent decades, with certain emerging countries catching up with developed countries. 
The core activities of traditional MNEs in emerging economies (e.g., greenfield investment, 
merger and acquisition, joint venture, and strategic alliance) have helped these emerging 
countries to enhance their economic status, and new MNEs from emerging economies are 
becoming increasingly connected with the advanced economies through similar activities. 
The success of all MNEs from all economies increasingly relies on strong connections to 
consumers, suppliers, and others in these host institutional environments. Hence, we argue 
that a novel “second-home” strategy will become increasingly critical to MNEs success in the 
future. By “second-home” we mean the salience of a new location being so great that MNEs 
must treat it as similar to their own original home (i.e., the first-home), and at the same time 
the context of the location is so distinctive that MNEs must treat it as unique from their own 
first home for the notion of second home (Li, 2015; cf. Galvin, Hexter & Hirt, 2010; Hoover, 
2006). The idea was suggested by the CEO of Danfoss from Denmark (Hoover, 2006), and 
then later adopted by some prominent MNEs from Europe (e.g., BMW, Grundfos, Mercedes- 
Benz, Porsche, SAP, Volvo, Volkswagen, among others). Among the Chinese MNEs, the 
second-home strategy is implicitly adopted in the case of the Geely-Volvo M&A (Yakob, 
Nakamura & Ström, 2018), and also explicitly implemented in the case of Huawei as pointed 
out by its CEO, Zhengfei Ren, that Huawei takes Europe as its second home (Huawei, 2019). 
In a sharp contrast to the “authentic” MNEs who rely on the “heritage endowments” built at 
home so that they “resist and limit local adaptation of process and products, and 
internationalize only if opportune by deploying preservation capabilities” (Arikan, Koparan, 
Arikan & Shenkar, 2019: 1), the second-home strategy bears unique implications for MNEs 
in the context of BRI and beyond (Li, 2018).  
 16 
Given the extreme contextual distances between the advanced and emerging economies 
as the global divide, it is imperative to move up or down along the market segments across 
such a global divide, but little is known about how such movements occur. That is, how 
advanced economy MNEs move down from the high-end to the mid-end segment, and how 
their emerging economy counterparts move up from the low-end to the mid-end segment. As 
a result, we frame the global divide as both a challenge and an opportunity for MNEs on both 
sides of the divide.  
However, the extant literature on global strategy does not directly address this issue. All 
existing models of global strategy share a set of implicit assumptions (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1998). First, they assume that the most critical markets exist only in the advanced economies 
(i.e., the so-called “triad”, including North America, West Europe, and East Asia). Second, 
they assume that the cross-divide expansion is similar to the within-divide (i.e., between the 
advanced economies or between the emerging economies) expansion. Third, they assume that 
each MNE should have either multiple homes (e.g., multi-domestic strategy and transnational 
strategy), or only a single home (e.g., international strategy and “global” strategy). Further, 
the emerging models of linkage-leverage-learning (Mathews, 2002), springboard (Luo & 
Tung, 2007), and learning-based internationalization (Li, 2010) also assume a catching up or 
leapfrogging process out of a single home. Finally, one view posits that it is extremely hard to 
be a true global player with multiple homes (Collinson & Rugman, 2008; Ghemawat, 2001, 
2011; Li & Li, 2007), and thus only a small fraction of MNEs can claim to qualify since the 
majority of the world’s largest MNEs are regional (home-region or bi-region) players 
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2003, 2004). This implies that most MNEs tend to engage in global 
activities from the perspective of their original homes. Hence, the issue of having a single 
home or multiple homes for MNEs is salient as part of their global strategies, especially in 
the context of the global divide. We posit that a novel perspective is needed to specifically 
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take on the issue of bridging and leveraging the global divide and believe that global 
innovation is a salient enabler in the process of addressing this need. We also argue that the 
biggest challenge to innovation is not so much in the domain of technology as in that of 
business models.  
Moving up and down along the different market segments across the global divide is a 
major part of the business model for various MNEs with significant implications for their 
innovation activities. There are many critical challenges regarding how to create and deliver 
the distinctive values to customers in the advanced and emerging markets. A business model 
defines how an enterprise creates and delivers value to customers (Teece, 2010). One option 
is the “second-home model” as a potential business model for both advanced and emerging 
MNEs, with both similarities and distinctions between the first and second homes as a duality.  
The duality of similarity-distinction captures the essence of the second-home model as the 
imperative step toward the dual-core model. We frame the business model at the first stage of 
focusing on the home region as the first-home model; the business model at the second stage 
of focusing on building a new home as the second-home model, and the business model at the 
third stage of global players as the dual-core model (with the first “core” for the advanced 
markets as a cluster, and the second “core” for the emerging markets as a cluster, thus 
effectively covering the whole world with the dual cores). For the dual-core model, the 
analogy of “dual-core” design in the architecture of a computer’s central processing unit 
(CPU) is relevant.  
The basic assumptions for the second-home model (also the dual-core model) are twofold. 
First, each MNE has a built-in core competence derived from the context of its first home, 
which we can call “first-home lock-in” as a path-dependent tendency to rely on the old core 
(Sydow, Schreyogg & Koch, 2009; cf. Arikan et al., 2019; Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Rugman 
& Verbeke, 2003, 2004). Second, the cross-divide expansion requires a path-breaking effort 
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to build a new core, which we can call “second-home breakout” (Li, 2013; cf. Kalasin, 
Dussauge & Rivera-Santos, 2014). In other words, while the first-home model is about 
exploiting the old core competence, the second-home model is about exploring a new core 
competence, and the dual-core model is about leveraging/integrating the two distinctive core 
competences (cf. Arikan et al., 2019; Li, 2010, 2013). It is worth noting that the dual-core 
model is necessary not only due to the extreme contextual distances or gaps between the two 
sides of the global divide, but also due to the extreme organizational inertia or bias of the 
first-home lock-in (as possibly the greatest challenge to the second-home model, thus 
rendering “unlearning” salient, cf. Arikan et al., 2019). For the purpose of building path-
breaking new core competence via unlearning the old core one, cross-divide M&As can be 
highly instrumental (Li, 2010, 2015; Madhok & Keyhani, 2012; Karim & Mitchell, 2000). It 
is worth noting that the second-home strategy even implies that a truly global MNE should 
have two relatively independent headquarters, one for all operations on the side of advanced 
economies, and the other for all operations on the side of emerging economies, while there is 
an overlap in the board membership between the two headquarters for the special benefit of 
synergy via cross-divide leverage (Li, 2015).  
Historically, a traditional strategy of MNEs from advanced economies is to sell their 
products globally with limited local adaptation. This strategy can work well when selling to 
other advanced markets and, to a lesser extent, to the high-end segment in the emerging 
markets. Recently, some MNEs like GE (Immelt, Govindarajan & Trimble, 2009) have 
recognized that this approach might not be a good strategy to penetrate the fast-growing mid-
end market (when the low-end one is much harder, or even undesirable) in the emerging 
economies. On the other hand, emerging MNCs from emerging economies are not always 
happy with the low-end products they sell in the advanced markets, and their long-term 
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vision might be to enter the higher-end (typically the mid-end) market segment in the 
advanced markets (Li, 2007, 2010).  
In the context of BRI, the above second-home strategy bears unique implications for both 
Chinese and non-Chinese MNEs. First, as a special attempt to bridge the global divide in the 
context of BRI, it is imperative for Chinese MNEs to move up to Europe, and for European 
MNEs to move down to China. It is worth noting that China has been often singled out as the 
most suitable choice of second home for many European MNEs. In other words, China tends 
to be taken as the most popular representative of emerging economies in terms of being the 
best location to develop the second core competence and the second headquarters. This trend 
can be further facilitated by the BRI.  
Second, the second-home strategy is related to the three-stage pattern of the BRI mega-
project. At the first stage of the BRI mega-project, both Chinese and European MNEs must 
firmly establish themselves in each other’s region as their second home so as to gain the 
status of local insider, rather than being seen as an external intruder. At the second stage of 
the BRI mega-project, both Chinese and European MNEs must firmly establish themselves in 
the regions or countries along the route of the BRI mega-project as their multiple components 
of their second homes with the strong status of local insider, rather than external intruder. At 
the third stage of the BRI mega-project, all MNEs across the world in the future must firmly 
establish themselves in other non-home countries or regions as their second home with the 
strong status of local insider, rather than external intruder. This clearly reflects the deep-level 
essence of the BRI mega-project as an inter-continental ecosystem for a long-term symbiosis 
on the global scale as well as the inter-regional scale between China and Europe.  
Third, in a separate study, we have developed an initial index of corporate readiness for 
the second-home strategy (Li, 2015). The index consists of two major parts. First, MNEs 
adopting the second-home strategy should be prepared to build up functional capabilities in 
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the second home, including full-fledged production, marketing, and R&D functions, in an 
evolutionary process from limited capabilities to full capabilities. For example, MNEs 
initially carry out their R&D at their first home in the first phase; then they move some of 
R&D activities (mostly D part) to the second home in the second phase; in the third phase, 
they move more R&D activities (mostly a small part of R, which we term “r”) to the second 
home, and at the final phase, they move full R&D activities to the second home. Second, 
MNEs adopting the second-home strategy should be prepared to build up organizational 
capabilities in the second home, including organizational structure and process, corporate 
vision and culture, and leadership style and pattern, also in an evolutionary process from 
limited capabilities to full capabilities. For example, MNEs initially adopt the first-home 
practices in the second home in the first phase; then they adapt the first-home practices to the 
second home in the second phase; in the third phase, they develop some new practices in the 
second home, and at the final phase, they leverage and integrate the practices of both the first 
and second homes.    
Conclusion 
Despite the major concerns and challenges for the BRI mega-project, especially from the 
EU perspective, but also from the US perspective, above and beyond the Chinese perspective, 
the BRI can be reframed as a mega-project of international collaboration between China and 
Europe toward an inter-continental ecosystem for a long-term symbiosis in the emerging era 
of neo-globalization. The key lies in the deep-level essence of the BRI mega-project, but the 
jury is still out concerning the actual execution and implementation of the BRI mega-project. 
In this sense, the MoU between China and Italy is an excellent case to follow. It is worth 
repeating that the BRI mega-project can be reframed as primarily geo-economic, rather than 
geo-political, in nature. Further, given the historical links between Europe and China, the BRI 
mega-project is primarily about the geo-economic cooperation between Europe and China, 
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and only secondarily about the geo-economic cooperation above and beyond Europe and 
China into other regions and continents.  
However, the issue of the BRI mega-project should also be analyzed in the broader 
context of future links between China and the rest of the world, including the China-US link 
(see Li, 2019 for a review). According to a five-part series of in-depth reports by the New 
York Times in November 2018, the world is both fascinated and puzzled by the so-called 
China Model as a dual-track reform approach with limited reforms in the political domains, 
but major reforms in the economic domains (Bradsher & Yuan, 2018; Pan, 2018; also see Li, 
2005 for a review). For example, “China succeeded by creating its own model. It borrowed 
some Western ideas while rejecting others. It opened itself to the world when necessary, and 
put on the brakes when it chose to. It set goals and backed them with government money. It 
freed its people to make and spend money, but it forbade them to ask for a better deal” 
(Bradsher & Yuan, 2018: 3). In other words, China did not like the Western playbook, so it 
wrote its own (Petricevic & Teece, 2019; Teece, 2020; Witt, 2019). More specifically, China 
has veered between competing impulses since the collapse of Soviet Union, i.e., “between 
opening up and clamping down, between experimenting with change and resisting it, always 
pulling back before going too far in either direction for fear of running aground” (Pan, 2018: 
4). It is interesting to note the China Model seems to be paradoxical in nature, thus consistent 
with the Chinese traditional perspective of yin-yang balancing (Li, 2016). 
Finally, it is the special context of the BRI mega-project that can greatly enhance the 
salience of second-home strategy as an effective approach to bridging the global divide. In 
this sense, the second-home strategy is directly related to the BRI mega-project. Hence, one 
of the most salient strategic (both theoretical and practical) implications of the BRI mega-
project for all MNEs involved is to adopt the second-home strategy so as to become truly 
global players in the emerging era of neo-globalization. 
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